Sunday, January 12, 2014

Panic of 53 BC


Martin Armstrong


Panic 53bc rome

Caesar-BlackBust-2
Julius Caesar (100-44BC)
The economic history of mankind has always been a story of boom and bust. Throughout time, we find crisis after crisis in the recorded pages of history. The slogans of revolution or revolt have far too often been merely a disguise for economic motives by the state, king, minister or emperor. The true story of Caesar and his clash with the Roman Senate led by Pompey is far from the noble story of purely defending the Republic against the ambitions of a ruthless dictator. For all the criticisims, Caesar by his actions was a man of the people from the days of doing battle against the dictator Sulla right up until his death by the hands of the questionable noble Senators of Rome.
It is not hard to understand the economic conditions that prevailed during the Civil War and the rise to power of Julius Caesar. Imagine how corrupt our modern-day democracies have become with political pay-offs, self-interest, intentional deadlocks and endless debates. The Senate of Rome was not much different from the current houses of government in our modern era. The same human emotions of power and greed that corrupt our present system also infected the politics of the Roman Republic as it approached its final hour in 44 BC.
Unfortunately, Shakespeare may have done more to distort the truth about Caesar than any historian. While Shakespeare was merely trying to create art, contemporary historians were trying to glorify the virtues of the Senate by slandering the nature and intentions of Caesar. But of all the rulers who either inherited power or stole it in the still of the night, no other leader has ever displayed such determination for justice and fairness. Caesar was no ambitious man purely for the sake of glory as one might argue about Nero or Caligula. Caesar sought true reform that would benefit the people first and the Senate of Rome last.
In our modern arrogance, we tend to feel so superior to these generations that have gone before us. We have cars, trains, planes, medicine and we have even landed on the Moon. Surely, with all these accomplishments, little remains in common with the past. However, when the subject turns to economics, very little progress has taken place in 6,000 years. Banking still functions very much the same today as it did in the days of Julius Caesar – minus credit cards and electronic wire transfers. Interest rates still fluctuate according to supply and demand today as they did in Caesar’s day. Real estate booms and busts still plague our modern economy as they did thousands of years ago. Indeed, to understand Caesar the man, we must also understand the monetary crisis that he and the people of Rome faced at the critical moment in time, which ultimately dealt the final death blow to the Republic while providing the spark of life to the Imperial era that followed.
The events that led to Caesar’s death are deeply entwined with not merely political intrigue, but with the cold hard human emotion of greed. When we think of the Roman Empire, few realize that there was a banking system and interest rates just as we have today. It was very much the abuse of credit by the state that severely weakened the Roman Empire and ultimately contributed to its collapse. It was the Dark Age that followed in which a period where credit and banking all but disappeared from western European culture. The monetary crisis that emerged at the time of the Civil War was very much a debt crisis that had been caused by yet another period of excessive credit and corruption.
There are many ancient historians who have recorded the facts as they were or sometimes slanted with a few personal biases here and there. During Caesar’s time, interest rates were far more volatile than they have been since the Great Depression. The elections of 53 BC illustrate that fact. The elections of 53 BC effectively degenerated into a bidding war between the various factions. Under the pretense of helping candidates with their expenses, the bottom line was simple bribery. We know from various contemporary authors of the time, that the bribery was so intense, that interest rates jumped from 4% to 8% during those elections. This bidding war was so serious, that the Senate of Rome was forced to act. Pompey professed to be shocked at the entire affair which was highly unlikely given his part in the dealings. The Senate was forced to announce prosecutions against all concerned, and the offices of Consul were given to other parties following a confession by one candidate, Memmius. Political contribution scandals are still taking place today as they did thousands of years ago.
Credit and debt had played a key role in many of the political events in man’s history. Following the Civil War in which Pompey was defeated by Caesar, one such monetary crisis threatened the entire political system of Rome. If one were to take an objective view of Caesar and read between the lines of contemporary writers, it is not difficult to see the frustration that Caesar must have felt with the situation. Many of the leading Senators were in fact the moneylenders themselves clearly in a position of conflicting interests. Many Senators sought governorships through which they became unspeakably wealthy. Thus to be a Senator during the later Republic, was indeed a gateway to the rich and famous.
The monetary crisis following the Civil War period was not unlike that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The chief problem seems to have been a shortage of cash. An enormous quantity of coin was taken to pay the rival armies in the conflict, and because of general insecurity among the populace, hoarding had withheld vast sums of cash from general circulation and banks. Consequently, money had become so scarce, there was simply not enough cash available to repay the outstanding levels of debt. Creditors were frantically trying to recover their loans, but the borrower, quite unable to satisfy them, were obliged to forfeit their mortgaged property and all allotments as well. However, this only created additional hardships through the collapse of economic activity. Because creditors were not interested in real estate properties by and large due to the shortage of cash, real estate values plummeted as was the case during the 1930s. Meanwhile, the savage and unfair laws written by the Senate against debtors applied creating a growing sense of unfairness among the populace.
This is the backdrop to the real story of Caesar’s assassination. Given the biased position of many Senators as moneylenders, it is unlikely that they would have handled the situation in a fair manner. Perhaps in such situations a dictator was indeed necessary and this may have played a large part in the role of Caesar during this period.
Caesar proposed some interesting solutions. He forbade the hoarding of cash like Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. However, at the same time, Caesar obliged creditors to accept land and movable goods in repayment. An interesting touch, which may have cost Caesar his life, was how the valuations of such property were to be used to settle the debt disputes. Consider for one moment, that the loans taken before the debt crisis struck were based upon land values at their peak. Given the collapse in the free markets and the rise in value of cash, creditors then seek to collect full value of their loans in currency, which is actually worth substantially more in purchasing power during a depression. The common denominator during all financial panics is the demand for cash and liquidity. This crisis during the late Republic is no different with respect to liquidity. Caesar realized that the differential between pre-crash values and money compared to post-crash depreciated values and the rise in purchasing power of cash unjustly benefits creditors at the expense of debtors. For example, a house worth $100,000 before the crash becomes worth $50,000 in the post-crash era. Therefore, if the creditor were to collect $100,000 on the old loan, he has doubled his money from a purchasing power perspective.
Caesar’s unique solution is something that deserves close study. Caesar demanded that creditors not merely be obliged to accept real estate and movable objects in repayment, he also decreed that the valuations on such property would be established at pre-crash levels. He established state valuers to place official values on all property. These special state valuers were appointed by the city praetor. Caesar in addition decreed that all interest previously paid by debtors to their creditors should be deducted from the principle of the loan in question. Given the fact that interest prior to the election of 53 had stood at 4% and in post-election years 8%, the interest rate at the peak of speculation prior to the crash stood at 12%. One can easily see, therefore, that the interest abatement was indeed a major concession that would not have sat well with the moneylenders.
The exact timing of these events is not certain. But we know that these events took place between the years 49 and 44 BC – the last 5 years during Caesar’s life. We know that Marc Antony and Dolabella were buying up the properties of political exiles and casualties of the Civil War believing that Caesar would outright abolish all debts. In fact, Antony even purchased the palace and salves of the fallen Pompey the Great at auction assuming he would never have to pay. Unfortunately for Antony, Caesar did not simply wipe the slate clean and their purchases needed to be settled.
Clearly, the measures taken by Caesar warrant investigation. The economy was stabilized. It is difficult to determine the long-term effects due to the assassination of Caesar and the outbreak of war as Antony and Octavian pursued Brutus and his compatriots. Nevertheless, the measures of Caesar stand alone within the solutions to monetary crisis situation throughout time. Obviously, demanding debts incurred prior to a crash be settled at the same face value after the crash is the very essence of monetary crisis irrespective of the time period we discuss.
Caesar’s actions in this case do not suggest that he was a ruthless dictator. Nor does the evidence support internal corruption within his administration given that Marc Anthony was forced to honor his debts as well. It is obvious that the actions or Caesar were in fact for the benefit of the people at the expense of a corrupt Senate of Rome.

Panic of 354 BC Athens


Martin Armstrong


Panic 354bc AthensAthen Akropolis_by_Leo_von_Klenze
Corruption between government and the bankers is nothing new. During the 4th Century BC, money that was donated to the gods became the temple treasure. Typically, the government would borrow from this hoard of cash and thus temples emerged as bankers. In Athens, there was one of the early banking crisis events involving what we would call the Secretary of the Treasury so to speak and his banking friends. While there may be some parallels to Hank Paulson helping Goldman Sachs during the crisis of 2007-2009, the events that took place are different, while the ethics are probably very similar.
The Temple kept its donations in the Opisthodomos. The Temple was not earning interest on its hoard of cash. The treasurer agreed to lend the money to personal banking friends who would then pay the treasurer interest that he could then personally put in his pocket. When the banking crisis hit and there was a liquidity problem, the banks could not repay the loans to the Temple.
Demosthenes-2Demosthenes (384-322BC) tells us that banking transactions were completely confidential in Athens. He tells us that the rich could “conceal [their] wealth .or in order that [t]he[y] might obtain secret returns through the bank.” Dem 45.66.
The banker Aristolochos was said to have taken substantial deposits and owed many a significant amount of funds (Dem 46.50). The bankers Sosinomos and Timodemos failed with many others and were unable to meet demands for withdrawals (Dem 36.50).
With a banking crisis in full bloom, now the treasurer was exposed. To try to cover-up the scandal, they set fire to the Opisthodomos. Nevertheless, the scheme was detected and the Treasurers of Athena were seized and imprisoned, about 377-376BC.
In 1989, government ministers of Crete pulled the same scam. They were depositing government funds in the Bank of Crete and interest was being diverted to themselves.
It was the failure of the Bank of Crete that exposed the scam (See NY Times, 9/21/89, A14; 9/27/89, A3).
Aristolochos’ bank failed it appears due to real estate prices collapsing, (Dem 36.50). Then the bankers failed, all of their funds and property were seized. What is interesting is that Demosthenes warns his fellow Athenians of the dire consequences for all of Attica ~hould the banker Phormion be forced into bankruptcy. “Don’t throw [him] away! Don’t allow this piece of filth to bankrupt him!” (Dem 57-58).
What Demosthenes sees in the midst of one of the earliest banking crisis in all recorded history, is that the lending of money was clearly a leverage that indeed had supported the entire economy. The drop in real estate in ancient Athens is not unlike that of the 2007 crisis. The deep corruption on the part of the Treasurer is something that sets off a public crisis in the collapse of confidence in banking.
Demosthenes does make it clear that the people should be angry at the bankers who failed (Dem 49.68). Reading between the lines implies he is trying to counsel the people that they should not panic and then withdraw their funds from all bankers. They should be justly concerned and outraged by the bankers who have failed, but do not by any means attribute that to all bankers.
These are words that have been repeated countless times in the midst of every panic throughout every century. They are repeated once again today, with record huge bailouts. Demosthenes focuses on the individuals and tries to dispel the CONTAGION that was then spreading throughout the entire economy.
There appears to have been a second period of a bank failure about 336BC that involved a banker by the name of Herakleides. There is no doubt debates over these
serious accounts. The 370BC decade was one of a major Athenian banking crisis that seems to have involved government officials that should come as no surprise.
Aristotle-2
Aristotle in his “Politics” argued against the idea of supply and demand insofar as he saw the problem from the demand side disconnected from supply. Aristotle thus
saw the problem that demand would rise and fall and sometimes exceed the supply without just cause.
Athens was making a transition from a predominant agrarian society to one of trade that included manufacture and finance. He called this the “monied mode of acquisition” that was driving the economy fed by businessmen concerned purely with profit that he described as“making money from one another.” The predominant economy was the villa that produced and consumed what it planted. Thus, his Politics (1256a-1257b) was describing the changing economy as Athens was rising as an economic power.
The old “oikos” had been this model of a self-sufficient, producing for its private consumption was fading. By the time we reach the 4th Century BC, agriculture is being raised and sold for cash. This, no doubt, caused land prices to rise. As people could now sell their crops for export, suddenly land prices would have now increased in value. This was one of the earliest bubble events in real estate that naturally resulted in a banking crisis no different from we have seen today and even in terms of the DOT-COM Bubble. Prices will always rise to reflect EXPECTED potential earnings, and then reality sets in. Hence, history repeats because the passions of man simply never change.
Xenophon-1
Xenophon (430-355BC) wrote his major work Oikonomikos (how to regulate the household = ECONOMICS) touting the virtue of the estate and a self-sufficient system. But by 355BC he had reversed himself in Poroi and . now promoted a market economy, encouraged immigration for labor, and to increase the m~ney supply that was raising the living standards of all Athenians.
There is little doubt the banking crisis is far from over. This is merely the pause between storms. Most pension funds and banks rely upon government debt. Because we are in the midst of a sovereign debt crisis, we are in very serious trouble. The banks that typically will get hit the worst are in fact those engaged in trading. The merchant banks throughout history will be hit so hard that there will be no time to run. They will simply fold in the middle of the night. No matter how much political clout they may have behind the scenes, it will not help.
Throughout history, those bankers who always go down in flames and have destroyed the economy to varying extents, have always been those who are traders. They are also touted as the best, brightest, and richest. However, these laurels are often short-lived. Today we have Goldman Sachs who has pursued political control no different from all the famous merchant bankers before them. The one firm that was on top of the world was indeed Solomon Brothers. They were king of the hill and Goldman Sachs yearned for their power . from the shadows. The downfall of Solomon was linked to the collapse in commodities when gold crashed from $875 to under $300 between 1980 and 1985.
The some 6,000 bank failures of the Great Depression had a common theme. They were speculating and trading. That was the entire purpose of the regulations that had separated banks, brokers, and insurance. It was former Chairman of Goldman Sachs Robert Rubin who worked to repeal that in 1992 that has enable the economic crisis to unfold by blending trading, banking, and insurance causing the bailout of AIG.
These events are by far nothing new. We have banking crisis after crisis from ancient times through medieval, which all have the same root cause – trading and corruption of government.

Financial Crisis of the 14th Century

Martin Armstrong

Panic 14th

Avignon,_Palais_des_Papes
Templar-ExecutedThe Financial Crisis of 1294 that erupted with the seizure of the  Bonsignore’s Gran Tavolaby Philip IV of France, expanded rapidly with the seizure of the Papacy itself. Avignon isoften referred to as the “City of Popes”because of the presence of the French anti-Popes from 1309 to 1423 during the seizure of the Catholic church often referred to by the real Catholics as the years of captivity. Philip IV seized all the assets of the Church and then used his puppet pope to seize all the Templars and effectively burned them alive. That date has ever since lived on as being unlucky - Friday, 13th October 1307
Seizing bankers who dared to lend to government became very popular way to default on public debt. Under Edward II (1307-1327), the English Parliament passed the Ordinances that was directed at alien merchant bankers blaming inflation and just about everything else upon their presence.The next merchant banker to go down was the Frescobaldi. There was the collapse and bankruptcy of the Bardi and the Peruzzi during the 14th century. Banking and lending to kings proved to be a total disaster.

Financial Crisis of 13th Century

Martin Armstrong


Panic 13th

Lucca-ItalyLucca-Oath
Banking reemerged after the fall of Rome in Northern Italy. In the town of Lucca, merchant-bankers set up tables in the square to deal with money from exchange, taking deposits, and lending. On the wall of the church in the square you will find to this day the oath of the moneychangers – “no theft, nor trick nor falsification.” The industry was born on trust and ethics.
Edward-I DrawingThere was the Riccardi, the merchant bankers of Lucca who got caught in a serious liquidity crisis of 1294. Edward I of England seized the bankers, imprisoned some and in fact defaulted upon all his loans from them. It was Edward I who also expelled all the Jews from England because he had borrowed from them as well and could not repay his debts. He thus expelled the Jews and would not allow them to take their assets thereby confiscating the wealth of the Jews as well. They then fled to Germany for the most part.
One must always dig just a bit deeper. The King’s debts owed to the Riccardi have gained attention in most accounts of the events of 1294. However, we also see debts owed to the Riccardi or 5 earls and at least a dozen important men in the administration of the king. The claim was that the Riccardi owed the crown 29,609 pounds, but failed to deduct 18,924 pounds owed them by the king. Using the government profits made from the seizure of their wool alone, the net outstanding amount would be reduced to 3,324 pounds. The debts owed to the Riccardi from the king’s ministers was 6,927 pounds. In this case, The scheme was hatched by Laurence of Ludlow who ironically sailed from England with 227 sacks of wool seized from the Riccardi merchant bankers to be sold on the continent, but the ship was so overloaded to save on shipping, that it sank in the Channel taking Laurence with it to the bottom.
siena-piazzacampo2bSiena


Banking had become a major enterprise in Siena. The first major banker of the era was Orlando the son of Bonsignore di Bernardo, who was a minor merchant. Orlando, together with his brother Bonifazio, expanded the family fortunes and by 1230 he was probably the richest man in Siena. Orlando’s friendship with Pope Innocent IV led to the Bonsignori acting as the first real Papal agents and bankers.
In 1255, after Bonifazio’s death, Orlando formed a consortium called the Gran Tavola(“Great Table”), which soon became the most powerful bank in all of Europe. The Gran Tavola became the exclusive banker for the deposits of the income of the Papal States and, under Pope Clement IV, the ecclesiastical tithes for the Holy Land. The Gran Tavolasupported Charles of Anjou in his conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily, and benefited greatly from his victory over the Hohenstaufen. Orlando Bonsignori died in 1273. After his death the Gran Tavola soon declined and eventually went bankrupt in the early 14th century.
Philip IV France
That bankruptcy took place because of the sovereign default of France, when King Philip IV (1268-1314) simply refused to honor his debts. Philip IV seized Gran Tavola merchant bankers of Siena, and the collapse of the Bonsignori, set off a cascade failure that set back banking for some time.
The credit crisis of 1294 was monumental. Philip IV did not stop there. The Pope tried to save the funds of the Papacy from the seizure of the Bonsignori operation. This led to the seizure of the Papacy itself and Philip IV then moved the church from Rome to France. He then installed his own French Pope who declared the Knights Templar were violating the laws of God to justify seizing all their banking aspects. He tortured and killed all the Knights Templar he could find.

Collectibles Are Still in Bull Market


1787-brasher-doubloon
The first gold coin produced in the American Colonies is known as the 1787 Brasher Doubloon Realizes that was just sold at the Heritage auction for $4,582,500. Ancient coins are generally up substantially over the last 10 years with pieces that sold for $20,000 in 1994 bringing today $150,000 to $200,000. Money continues to move out of banks and bonds looking to get off the grid. These market may still rise sharply and the peak appears to be actually 2025 or the peak on the next 8.6 year wave completing a cycle wave from the 1994 low.

Thursday, January 9, 2014

Cycle inversion ?


What Are we Waiting for in Markets?

Corp-Treas%
At some point we will experience a Cycle Inversion meaning the targets remain the same, but what we get is the opposite event. Why will this INVERT? At some point the THINKING process must flip whereas the FLIGHT to quality has been traditionally people sell private assets and run to government paper. But what happens when government is the problem? Capital will start to flee from government to the private sector assets. Although the USA did not default or even suspend its debt during the 1930s, the contagion affect from Europe still impacted the trends within the United States. Here we can see that the spread between AAA corporate paper and government paper began to narrow as people realized that government debt might be a problem. The City of Detroit defaulted back then as well,
The timing targets will not change – we just get the opposite event. I have demonstrated how the fixed cycle in gold produced highs going up and then the same cycle produce a low by 1985. We achieved a similar even on the ECM in 1987. The turning point came precisely to the day, but we achieved the LOW rather than the high. That enabled us to forecast that the low was in place and new highs would be seen by 1989.
What is possible currently is that if the share market backs off and moves into a February low, then a rally into late Summer is likely with the Fall correction. That could continue into a low for 2015.75 and this would suggest a possible cycle inversion meaning the flight to quality reverses post-2015.75 and instead of government debt, we see capital move into private assets. However, a high in Feb reverses the outcome.
The question that will need to be answered is what happens post-2015.75? We will go over this at the conferences. The traditional Flight-To-Quality being a rush to government paper may be the opposite so we see a rally as the flight unfolds with government paper. Even gold rallied with the downside of the ECM dramatically. It experiences a tough of the flight to quality.
GlobalCorrelationModel
These events are determined not by OPINION, but by the correlation of how all markets are responding. This produces a movement that is unified on a global scale. This is part of understanding who everything is connected. As long as the Dow does not exceed the December high, we cannot rule out a February low. That low may not be much to write home about. The depth is irrelevant unless we elect Weekly Bearish Reversals.

US and Europe-2014. February - cycle inversion ?

Euro – Cycle Inversion or Phase Transition




QUESTION: Martin
In your latest post you go into very good detail of how the Euro continues to be strong(although it has been noted the model expected it to fall) and that when the Euro does fall it will take the European markets with it. Are we to assume that if the dollar does rally it will take the DOW with it as well?  Any update on the cycle inversion?
Regards,
JCL
ANSWER: This whole extension of the markets is early. But it is not yet complete and it is still not certain if we are getting the Cycle Inversion or the Phase Transition.We may not know this until February. Ideally, the Euro would normally have declined into Jan/Feb and so should have the share markets. We warned last summer that the Euro could rally into Jan/Feb, which was based on the preliminary capital flow trends. That has been the case, but the euro has not blasted up to new highs – it has just traded sideways while remaining strong thanks to deflation yet stuck between the Reversals at 14700 and 12950. It has neither elected Bullish or Bearish Reversals. The model has provided no buy or sell signals as of yet.

The share markets have rallied. But look closely and you will see the Dow just backed off with January. So it is not yet definitive. February is a turning point. We should get the opposite trend thereafter into the Spring. The timing never changes which is why I specify these are TURNING POINTS not specific highs or lows. It is a chain reaction process of extraordinary dynamic complexity. Absolutely every market movement around the world combines into creating the OVERALL trend. Nothing moves in total isolation.

If we get the Cycle Inversion early, that would push the rally beyond 2015 and we may then see the market rising when the ECM declines for capital would then realize government is the problem and it then has no choice but to move into private assets. The question is do we get this now or on the next wave where Panic Cycles are already projected for 2024 the top of the next wave.

To some extent, this is what happens in a hyperinflation of a revolutionary government where people neither hoard cash nor keep money in banks. The hyperinflation is spending money as quickly as you get it so the VELOCITY of money rises tremendously. Deflation is the hoarding of money and assets. This has nothing to do if money is fiat or not since in truth all money is fiat when when it is gold coins. The gold standard was fiat where the government dictated gold was $35 and never changed it. In that case, they undervalued gold. Fiat historically has worked both ways and the Swiss pegging the franc to the euro is again a dimension of fiat dictating the value of money.

We are not in a hyperinflationary situation but deflationary where established governments are trying to hold on to power and hunt down everything and everyone in the private sector. This is the opposite of a revolutionary government that has defaulted on all national debts of the prior government. They have nothing to pay off and no assets so they print to cover expenses. We are in the nasty government phase where as Herbert Hoover said when a government becomes enraged, it will burn down the bard to get the rat.

Capital is already shifting from bonds into equities in the USA at the pension fund level (not retail) because they have no choice. We are UNLIKELY to see the Dow decline when Europe fails, but this will be more akin to the Nikkei rising into a bubble for 1989 after the 1987 US Crash.
1900$X-M 1931 Sovereign Debt

We have a convergence of several trends. First there is the chaos in Europe from the insanity of government self-destructing the economy, but that domino has not yet fallen over. When it does, it will send cash pouring into the dollar as it did in 1931. Secondly, we have the crisis in pensions that is driving money away from bonds and into equity just to survive, The third major aspect yet to materialize will be the classic bubble with the retail market buying the highs on hype. Thirdly, there is the change in energy that has indeed impacted the global economy as 15 refineries in Europe have been forced to close as the USA no longer imports from Europe.